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Som-theme E: Financial markets and institutions
$EVWUDFW
Organizations in the health care sector are increasingly managed and judged
on the basis of economic criteria. At the same time they are faced with
growing risks which necessitate ‘appropriate’ reserves. Various major risks
are mentioned in this paper. Health care organizations are allowed to form
provisions instead of reserves, for some of these risks. The conditions under
which this is allowed are discussed, as are the criteria which indicate the
differences between reserves and provisions. The main part of this paper
consists of a critical description and analysis of two models which can be
used to determine the ‘appropriate’ size of reserves of health care
organizations.
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2 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
There are a great number of health care institutions in the Netherlands.
These institutions increasingly have to stand on their two feet (see for
example Vereniging Academische Ziekenhuizen, 1993; Coopers &
Lybrand, 1996). Funding methods are becoming more dependent on
outputs, competition between health care providers is increasing and the
organizations will run greater risks if they start using new treatment
methods. Furthermore, the central government is withdrawing more and
more as a guarantor and ‘catcher’ of the health care ‘organizations’ financial
risks. They need sufficiently large reserves in order to become and stay
financially independent. However, opinions tend to differ on the definition
of ‘sufficiently large’. The theory of finance provides hardly any insights
into the best possible financing structure because that theory is not
specifically geared to the nonprofit sector. In practice, the organizations
therefore employ rules of thumb. It is often argued, without any convincing
proof, that a reserve amounting to 5 per cent of the annual budget can be
considered to be ‘sufficient’ for an organization in the non-profit sector1.
The boards of non-profit organizations perceive this to be a low percentage,
whereas the funding government thinks that 5 per cent is too high (Feenstra
and Van Helden, 1995; Commissie Reserves Academische Ziekenhuizen,
1998).
This paper describes two models which may guide discussions in the non-
profit sector on the question of what size of reserves2 can be termed
3‘sufficient’. We call this size the ‘appropriate’ size of reserves. The paper is
structured as follows. Section 2 contains a risk analysis concerning
organizations in the health care sector. The boundaries between reserves and
provisions are continuously debated; section 3 describes the essential
differences between these concepts, as well as recent developments in
relevant international regulations. The main part of this paper is section 4,
which describes two models which can be used to determine the appropriate
size of reserves. The two models for determining the appropriate size of
reserves can also be used in other nonprofit sectors, such as universities or
museums, although several particular considerations have to be taken into
account then. This paper ends with a critical discussion of the strenghts and
weaknesses of the two models.
 5LVNVDQGUHVHUYHV
Both in absolute and in relative terms, the equity part in the balance sheet of
health care organizations is only small. Usually one finds a very small
amount of issued capital and a few kinds of reserves, of which the so-called
“reserve for acceptable costs” is the largest3 (see Aukes and Maat, 1997).
The main goals of the reserves are:
- to function as a buffer against general risks in order to safeguard the
continuity of the organization from unforeseen financial setbacks;
- to function as an equalization account in which operating surpluses and
deficits are entered;
- to make explicit those proposed spendings which are not yet external
liabilities (expressed as ‘appropriated reserves’4).
4The availability of reserves might contribute to the continuity of health care
organizations. Generally speaking, the larger the reserves are, the easier it is
to adapt after more or less serious setbacks. If an institution does not have a
sufficiently large buffer of reserves, it will often be forced, usually under
pressure of time, to take far-reaching measures which may severely disrupt
the rendering of services and the harmony in the organization. In addition,
the size of its reserves affects its chances of borrowing capital, for example
from banks and institutional investors. These lenders want to limit their
risks with respect to repayment and interest payable as much as possible and
therefore demand that borrowers should have a specific minimum amount of
reserves. An increase in reserves will result in more opportunities to borrow
capital and in lower risk mark-ups being charged by lenders.
The question remains what the size of the reserves should be. The answer to
this question should be determined by the risks run or envisaged by an
organization. Obviously, not all categories of organizations within the health
care sector are faced with similar risks. Although there are general trends
such as more influence from the market because the government is
withdrawing from the health care sector, increasing competition between
health care providers, and changes in funding models which have resulted in
the growing importance of more standardized budgets, there are also
differences between the specific risks in various segments of the health care
sector. University hospitals, for example, have a unique range of functions
and each of these functions has a unique risk profile. In addition, the range
of functions and the risk profiles can be slightly different in each university
hospital (Vereniging Academische Ziekenhuizen, 1993; Feenstra and Van
Helden, 1995; see also section 4).
5Apart from risks arising from differences in the range of functions, various
other sources of risks can be mentioned, such as:
a. the statutory duty to provide care fairly often leads to overstretched
budgets; any additional costs have to be borne by individual
organizations;
b. the outcome of collective bargaining is also dependent on market forces,
although there may not be enough resources available at the level of
individual organizations; all this is complicated further by changes in
social security costs, the fees of medical specialists, and the statutory
duty of insurers to enter into contracts with health care providers;
c. organizations will be hit even harder by disappointing receipts and/or
unforeseen expenses if they have inflexible cost structures and therefore
need a lot of time to make adjustments.
This paper will discuss two models which aim to determine the appropriate
size of reserves in health care organizations. Since these organizations are
allowed to make provisions for some risks – and therefore no reserve has to
be created for these risks – it is worthwhile to consider the relation between
provisions and risks first.
 5LVNVDQGSURYLVLRQV
In the balance sheet of an organization a distinction is made between the
equity part and the liability part. In the Netherlands it is common practice to
subdivide liabilities into debts and provisions. The distinction is based on
the extent to which uncertainty is existent. A debt is a (nearly) certain
liability; a provision is a liability with some uncertainty regarding the
amount and the time due; both liabilities result from events and/or
6transactions in the past. However, this difference is not always so clear-cut
in actual practice. The formation of provisions is usually only allowed if it is
certain or likely that a liability will be created and if it is also possible to
make a reliable estimate of its size. The terms ‘likely’ and ‘reliable estimate’
can be interpreted in more than one way; therefore the difference between a
debt (a certain liability of a certain size) and a provision is not always clear.
Because provisions refer to uncertain liabilities (which can be reliably
estimated), whereas reserves are primarily meant to serve as a buffer for
general risks, they are fundamentally different. Provisions must therefore be
shown separately in a balance sheet and must not be mixed with reserves.
In the Netherlands provisions include cost equalization accounts. In
international circles, particularly the International Accounting Standards
Committee (IASC), this interpretation is considered to be unacceptable.
Basically, provisions increasingly resemble debts in international
regulations, so that the subjectivity inherent in the formation of provisions is
slowly eliminated (IAS 37, 1998). This trend is strikingly similar to the
views prevalent in the Netherlands on the acceptability of allowing for
provisions when taxable profit is determined5. Further limitation of the
circumstances in which the formation of provisions is allowed is suggested
in the recent statement IAS 37. The introduction of this proposal in
anticipated Dutch legislation and regulations would result in a decrease in
the total number of provisions and even in the disappearance of a number of
types of provisions. In view of the frequency and range of existing
provisions, this could have substantial consequences for Dutch reporting
practices in profit-making as well as non-profit-making organizations. As
far as university hospitals are concerned, an empirical study conducted by
7us in 1995 suggests that these organizations sometimes decide to make
provisions for unconvincing reasons. Furthermore, some of the university
hospitals make a distinction between reserves and provisions which is not
convincing either (Feenstra-Van Helden, 1995).
The question of the acceptable level of provisions made by an institution in
the health care sector has been implicitly answered in this section. The level
wholly depends on the organization’s already existing liabilities which can
be reliably estimated, even though their exact size and dates of payment are
still uncertain. The formation of provisions will be justified if the
organization does have liabilities of that kind.
 7ZRPRGHOVIRUWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIDSSURSULDWHUHVHUYHV
This section will address two models for determining appropriate reserves in
health care organizations. Section 4.1 deals with the Feenstra-Van Helden
model, which particularly concerns university hospitals. Next, section 4.2
encompasses The Coopers & Lybrand model which has been developed for
the health care sector in general.
4.1. 7KH)HHQVWUD9DQ+HOGHQPRGHO
Feenstra and Van Helden (1995) have developed a normative framework
(model) which can be used to determine the reserve position of a university
hospital in accordance with the board’s wishes.
The functions of this model are:
a. to function as a starting-point for discussions on the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the organization’s ability to cope with any budgetary
deficits;
8b. to enable comparisons between the results of the model and the
organization’s actual reserve position at any time, and to enable any
subsequent modification of the policy on reserves which is pursued.
Although the model has been developed primarily for and is geared to
university hospitals, it may be useful in any other branch of the non-profit
sector. Although the specifications of the institutions’ functions will vary, as
will the assessments of the financial risks involved in the various functions,
the basic structure of the model will not have to be changed. It should be
pointed out that the model is not only suitable for a specific sector as a
whole but also for the individual organizations within that sector.
The model was structured as follows:
a. It was assumed that a university hospital is exposed to different risks
related to the various functions it performs. Six functions were
distinguished:
- ordinary patients care
- top clinical patients care
- top specialist care
- training
- workplace for a Faculty of Medicine
- development
b. After that, the extent and nature of the financial risks involved in each of
the functions were determined. The risks were divided into five classes:
- certainty in the short term as well as the long term (class 1);
9- some uncertainty in the long term and certainty in the short term
(class 2);
- uncertainty in the long term and reasonable certainty in the short
term (class 3);
- uncertainty in the long term and some uncertainty in the short term
(class 4);
- uncertainty in the short term as well as the long term (class 5).
Consultation of experts in the university hospital sector (i.e. top financial
executives) resulted in the following risk classes for each of the functions:
- ordinary patients care: risk classes 2/3;
- top clinical patients care: risk classes 2/3;
- top specialist care: risk class 4;
- training: risk class 2;
- workplace for the Faculty of Medicine: risk class 3;
- development: risk class 5.
For each of these functions the budgetary share for all the university
hospitals was calculated (based on: VAZ, 1993; VAZ = Vereniging van
Academische Ziekenhuizen, which can be translated as the Society of
University Hospitals).
c. Next, an attempt was made to determine the relative size of the reserves
(as a percentage of the budget) for each of the risk classes distinguished
under b. Since there are no clear causal relationships between risks and
reserves, the reserves for each risk class are expressed as a margin. The
following percentages were determined for the five risk classes
mentioned under b: less than 5% (class 1); 6-10% (class 2); 11-15%
(class 3); 16-20% (class 4); 21-30% (class 5).These margins of
10
percentual reserves were determined by considering other categories of
non-profit organizations which bear risks that are similar to the
functions in question of a university hospital. These so-called reference
sectors are: universities (class 2), general hospitals and universities
(classes 2 and 3), KEMA (i.e. Dutch quality control institute for
electrical material and appliances) and TNO (i.e. Dutch organization for
applied scientific research) (class 5). A reference sector for top
specialist care (class 4) could not be found.
d. Finally, the average appropriate reserves were determined by
multiplying the reserves for a function (as determined under c) by the
portion of the budget (as calculated under b) for this function.
Table 1 shows the results of the above model for determining a reserve
position. This table indicates that the reserves of the university hospitals as a
whole should range between 9.6% and 16.8% of the annual budget. In 1994
the actual reserves averaged 6.9%, which suggests that the reserve position
should be strengthened in the future. We will not discuss here whether the
actual percentage (6.9%) is relatively low because some of the reserves were
wrongly called provisions, although there is some evidence for this
overestimation of provisions at the expense of reserves (Feenstra and Van
Helden, 1995).
Changes in the portions of the budget mentioned in table 1 will have an
effect on the appropriate reserve positions. Obviously, different risk














Ordinary patients care 45.4%   6-15%  (class 2/3) 2.7-6.8%
Top clinical patients care 10.7%   6-15%  (class 2/3) 0.6-1.6%
Top specialists care 22.3% 16-20%     (class 4) 3.6-4.5%
Training   3.8%   6-10%     (class 2) 0.2-0.4%
Workplace for the Faculty 12.1% 11-15%     (class 3) 1.3-1.8%
Development   5.7% 21-30%     (class 5) 1.2-1.7%
total 100% 9.6-16.8%
4.2 7KH&RRSHUV	/\EUDQGPRGHO
Coopers & Lybrand’s (1996) model for determining the necessary minimum
size of reserves is also based on an analysis of the functions of reserves and
provisions (cf. the summary given in the sections 2 and 3 of this paper).
Also, where possible, comparisons are made with other sectors with similar
risk profiles. The most essential point of the model is the following
statement (p.7): ‘The minimum size of reserves needed for a buffer against
general risks is dependent on the estimated size of disappointing revenues,
the flexibility of the existing cost structure, and the time needed for
adjustments to costs’.
The model was structured as follows:
a. First, Coopers & Lybrand determined how much of the budget for
acceptable costs of AWBZ institutions (i.e. institutions falling under the
Medical Expenses Act) was generally intended for the following four
cost categories:
12
- staff costs (75%);
- material costs (15%);
- capital charges not according to reimbursable regulations (5%);
- capital charges according to reimbursable regulations (5%).
b. After that, they determined the time needed by an organization to adjust
itself, i.e. the organization as a whole, to financial setbacks concerning
the cost categories mentioned under a. They assumed that the reaction
times for the first three cost categories mentioned above were 2 years, 3
months, and 5 years respectively.
c. Next, they determined the weighted reaction time per percent financial
setback. Based on the reaction times mentioned under a, this weighted
reaction time is: 75% x 2 years + 15% x 0.25 year + 5% x 5 years = 1.8
years. This reaction time implies that an organization needs 1.8 years to
decrease its costs to a new budget level.
d. Assuming that in the future the AWBZ-sector has to deal with budgetary
setbacks ranging between 5% and 10%, the above will mean that the
minimum reserve position should range between 9% (i.e. 5 x 1.8) and
18% (i.e. 10 x 1.8). This implies that during the period of adaptation of
1.8 years a reserve of 9% or 18% respectively will be available to cover
the budgetary deficit.
e. In addition to the general risks in the AWBZ-sector, the model contains
estimates of a few additional risks in three subsectors within the health
care sector, namely:
13
- mental health care: 3 % because of the fund for health care reform
which may be set up, and 5% because of budget
limitation/flexibilization;
- care for disabled people: 4% because of the fund for health care
reform which may be set up;
- nursing care : 4% because of the fund for health care reform which
may be set up.
Assuming that not all additional risks occur simultaneously, only half of
the risks are added to the percentages calculated under d. This will result
in the following totals, i.e. the minimum percentages for the three
subsectors mentioned above, if the budgetary setback is 5%:
- mental health care: 9 + 0.50 (3 + 5) = 13%
- care  for disabled people: 9 + 0.50 x 4 = 11%
- nursing care: 9 + 0.50 x 4 = 11%.
Coopers & Lybrand argue that the percentages calculated under d are
relatively low in comparison with those for other sectors such as housing
corporations, the education sector, energy sector, and subsidized
institutions. A governmental board, on the other hand, is of the opinion
that the reserve position of organizations in the AWBZ-sector is rather
good (Commissie Reserves Academische Ziekenhuizen, 1998). Coopers
& Lybrand thinks that this opinion is based on an interpretation of
reserves which is rather unusual to say the least (according to this board,
reserves include provisions).
Coopers & Lybrand, too, wonder whether the actual reserve percentages
may be due to the formation of unjustifiable, and therefore too high,
provisions. The study states (p. 9): ‘We have found no indications that
14
the organizations have made unjustifiable and too high provisions. On
the contrary, we are inclined to think that some of the organizations do
not always make the provisions they need’. And: ‘The level of
provisions in the health care sector is relatively low, compared with that
in other sectors,’ (p. 9). Again, as in the section on the Feenstra-Van
Helden model, we will not discuss here the problems involved in
determining provisions. These problems have already been touched
upon in section 3.
 $FRPSDULVRQEHWZHHQWKHWZRPRGHOV
Both models are simple logical structures and result in relatively similar
appropriate reserve positions, provided that budgetary setbacks are
assumed to range between 5% and 10%. In the Feenstra-Van Helden
model the appropriate reserve positions range between 10% and 17%
(rounded off) of the annual budget, and the results in the Coopers &
Lybrand model range between 9% and 18%: Feenstra-Van Helden’s
model is more general in the sense that it is not dependent on budgetary
setbacks. Neither model can be used to determine what level of
provisions is required.
A recent report by the Commissie Reserves Academische Ziekenhuizen
(i.e. a committee which made a study of reserves of university hospitals,
(1998) argues that acceptable reserves should range between 8 and 12
per cent. Interestingly, this committee states that this standard lacks a
scientific basis and that it is difficult to provide this basis. A maximum
of 8 per cent of the budget for a health care organization (in this case a
university hospital) is considered an appropriate buffer against the risks
mentioned in the section 2. The committee justifies the margin between
15
8% and 12% as follows: the incentive to operate efficiently should not
be lost when the 8% level is reached. After reaching this level, the
organization is therefore allowed to add half of the annual surplus to the
reserves and to cream off the other half. When the reserve percentage
exceeds 12%, the whole annual surplus will be creamed off.
The two models described in this paper were developed primarily for the
health care sector (university hospitals and AWBZ-organizations), but
both can also be used in the non-profit sector in general. Because of
their transparent structure, the models are suitable tools for a board of
management or a supervisory board during discussions about the most
appropriate reserve position in connection with proposed strategic
changes in the range of functions or the cost structure of their
organization. However, both models are clearly based on disputable
suppositions. The weak point of the Feenstra-Van Helden model is the
division of functions into risk classes and the subsequent determination
of appropriate reserves per function on the basis of a comparison with
reference sectors. The relevance of characteristics of reference sectors is
debatable. In some cases, it may even be questionable whether there
exist relevant reference sectors. The weak point of the Coopers &
Lybrand model is the pivotal role of the ill-defined concept of reaction
time. In addition, the reaction times for various cost categories are
determined rather arbitrarily. The effects of a different division into risk
classes and a different determination of desirable reserves per function,
or a different division into reaction times have not been examined
systematically, but these changes may lead to very different results. If
so, this fact will harm the usefulness of the two models.
16
The main differences between the two models are the emphasis of
functions and risk percentages in the first model and the focus on
reaction times and various cost categories in the second model.
We will now critically review the similarities and differences of the two
models for determining the appropriate reserves for health care
organizations in a more constructive way. The main concept in this
review will be the organization’s ability to cope with unforeseen
setbacks resulting from external or internal risks, i.e. its power of
resilience or endurance. An adequate calculation of the external and
internal risks will indicate the extent to which power of endurance is
necessary. However, as will be argued below, the formation of a reserve
is only one measure to guarantee this endurance. The other two are cost
flexibility and organization flexibility.
Cost flexibility refers to the average time an organization needs to adapt
its cost level to income setbacks. If, for instance, an organization has
relatively high labour costs related to employees with a regular labour
contract, its cost flexibility is low. If, on the contrary, an organization
has many employees with a flexible labour contract, its cost flexibility
will be high. Similarly, assets which are owned by the organization
induce costs that are inflexible, whereas leased assets lead to
comparatively more flexible costs. Cost flexibility is the main issue in
the Coopers & Lybrand model. Obviously, it can be argued that the
higher cost flexibility is, the lower the required reserves have to be.
17
Organization flexibility is related to the ability of an organization to
substitute its available resources in another direction than the current
one. Suppose, for example that a health care organization is faced with a
substantial decrease in its funding for function X, whereas its funding
for function Y can be considerably increased. Then, the organization’s
flexibility will be higher to the extent that superfluous resources from
function X can be quickly removed to function Y, which asks for more
resources. Generally speaking, the following relation might be existent:
the higher the organization’s flexibility, the lower its cost flexibility can






A = organization flexibility






Figure 1 should be interpreted as follows: the larger the risk, the larger
the circle as a whole must be; A can be increased at the expense of C,
given B and B can be increased at the expense of C, given A.
The Feenstra-Van Helden model encompasses a framework for
calculating the risks of a health care organization, as well as for
translating these risks into an appropriate level of the reserve funds. This
model does not pay attention to cost flexibility and organization
flexibility. The Coopers & Lybrand model establishes the cost flexibility
of the organization – given the risks – and translates these into
appropriate reserve funds. This model may be enriched by relating the
reaction terms of the cost components to the organization flexibility.
Evidently, none of these models provides a complete insight into the
relationship between risks on the one hand and cost flexibility,
organization flexibility and appropriate reserve funds on the other hand.
Figure 1 gives a picture of these interdependencies. The total power of
endurance of an organization will be dependent upon its external and
internal risks. This power can take shape in various measures, i.e. cost
flexibility, organization flexibility and reserves which can be regarded
as communicating vessels. These three measures are depicted as
concentric circles in figure 1, and the total power of endurance equals
the surface area of the total circle.
It might be advisable to use both models simultaneously. The models
could be of great benefit to organizations because they would enable the
management to discuss appropriate reserves among themselves, or with
external parties, in a well-structured manner.
19
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1
 Interestingly, the reserve is related to the annual budget instead of the balance sheet
total. Comparisons between organizations are less well-founded if the balance sheets of
the organizations are compared, because the assets of the organizations may differ
widely in age. Comparisons based on annual budgets do not have this drawback
because annual budgets are determined more objectively.
2
 Other names are ‘adequate’ size, ‘desirable size, ‘permissible’ size (Feenstra and Van
Helden, 1996).
3
 This “reserve for acceptable costs” is an equalization account in which operating
surpluses and deficits are entered.
4
 In the Netherlands these reserves are called “bestemmingsreserves”.
5
 The Dutch do not recognize the concept of contingent liabilities, as far as this concept
refers to existent liabilities which do not comply with the rules of accounting for
provisions.
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